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Abstract—Vehicular networks, in which cars communicate
wirelessly to exchange information on trafﬁc conditions, offer
a promising way to improve road safety. Yet ensuring the
correct functioning of such a system is essential: malicious or
faulty devices transmitting inaccurate messages could trigger
accidents. Therefore, any errant device, along with the messages
it generates, must be identiﬁed and ignored as quickly as possible.
This task is especially challenging because traditional approaches
to revoking credentials use a central authority, causing long
delays during which the network is vulnerable. To eliminate this
window of vulnerability, we propose that vehicles locally decide
whether to exclude errant devices. We describe two ways of doing
so: ﬁrst, LEAVE, an existing protocol which allows devices to vote
by exchanging signed claims of impropriety, and second, Stinger,
a new protocol where a device unilaterally removes a misbe-
having neighbor by agreeing to limit its own participation. We
provide detailed simulations that offer insight into the protocols’
operations in the context of vehicular networks and enable a
powerful comparison between the strategies. We compare the
security and performance properties of LEAVE and Stinger
while varying attacker capabilities, trafﬁc conditions, and the
accuracy of the misbehavior detection mechanisms. We identify
several interesting trade-offs: Stinger is signiﬁcantly faster than
LEAVE at removing errant devices, but LEAVE excludes fewer
good devices when the attacker has compromised several devices
simultaneously; LEAVE is better at handling false positives,
but Stinger scales better when the trafﬁc density increases. As
a result, we conclude by outlining a combined protocol that
balances the security and performance characteristics of both
strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, consortia of automobile manufacturers in the US
[19], Europe [4] and Japan [1] have begun investigating ways
to equip vehicles with wireless radios for communicating
safety information. For instance, cars might send each other
collision warnings or trafﬁc congestion notiﬁcations.
Ensuring the integrity of safety communications is
paramount. Compromised transmitters might send bogus in-
formation for reasons that are selﬁsh (e.g., pretending there is
an automobile accident to divert trafﬁc away from the chosen
path and enjoy an uncongested ride) or malicious (e.g., faking
location information to encourage collisions). Alternatively,
the transmitters may simply be broken, which is a less sinister
but entirely plausible threat to message integrity.
Whenever a device starts sending bad information, the
long-term solution is for the certiﬁcation authority (e.g., the
Department of Motor Vehicles) to revoke the credentials of the
offending device. However, this process takes time, from the
collection of evidence to the resolution of disputed claims. In
the interim, ongoing attacks could endanger passenger safety.
Thus, there is a need to rapidly isolate such errant devices
and prevent them from spreading incorrect data. One solution
is for the cars observing misbehavior to temporarily exclude
the responsible bad device until the certiﬁcation authority is
notiﬁed and takes appropriate action. In this paper, we consider
ways to reach such a local decision while at the same time
maximizing efﬁciency and security.
We ﬁrst describe an already proposed local decision mech-
anism, called LEAVE, where nodes vote to exclude errant
devices by exchanging signed claims of impropriety [16]. We
then propose a new protocol, called Stinger, in which a node
can unilaterally remove a perceived misbehaving neighbor by
limiting its own participation. Stinger is a tempered adaptation
of the suicide protocol proposed for ad-hoc networks in [11].
We then set out to contrast the LEAVE and Stinger mecha-
nisms, ﬁnding that they often exhibit complementary security
and performance properties. This comparison is done through
extensive simulations and involves a detailed comparative
framework which supports varying attacker capabilities, char-
acteristics of detection mechanisms, and trafﬁc conditions.
We demonstrate the circumstances under which voting-based
LEAVE and unilateral Stinger perform best. Finally, we de-
scribe a hybrid protocol where cars are free to dynamically
choose between LEAVE and Stinger as their eviction strat-
egy depending upon trafﬁc conditions. This adaptive strategy
promises to achieve a more favorable balance of security and
performance than either strategy alone.
II. VEHICULAR NETWORKS
We now describe the operational characteristics of vehicular
networks.
A. System model
Existing automotive authorities are likely to become certi-
ﬁcation authorities (CAs). Each would be responsible for the
identity management of all vehicles registered in its respective
geographic region. Vehicles register with exactly one CA.
Each node has a unique identity, a pair of private and public
cryptographic keys, and a certiﬁcate issued by the CA.
Messages are transmitted periodically, e.g., every 0.3 s for
safety messages, or triggered by in-vehicle or network events.
Most trafﬁc is broadcast to limited regions of the network. All
safety-related messages include the time and geographical co-
ordinates of the sender, in addition to other application-speciﬁc
information. Each message is also signed and accompanied by
the sender’s certiﬁcate. It is widely accepted that asymmetric
cryptography is feasible for vehicular networks [15].
Safety messages may need to propagate across multiple
hops. In this case, they are signed and include the coordinates
and timestamp of the last relaying node, along with the
originator’s signature, coordinates and timestamp. This chain
of signatures helps ensure the freshness of the information
while limiting the propagation of illegitimate information. A
received safety message is discarded if the difference between
its timestamp and the timestamp of the receiver is greater
than a system-speciﬁc constant accounting for clock drift,
propagation and processing delays. Moreover, a message is
discarded (by a receiver) if the coordinates of its sender/relay
indicate that the receiver is outside the sender’s maximum
nominal wireless communication range. These validations are
applied at each hop.
At the data link layer, the Dedicated Short Range Commu-
nications (DSRC) protocol [2], currently being standardized as
IEEE 802.11p, provides transmission ranges of typically 300
to 1000 m, with data rates in the 6-27 Mbps range. Beyond
DSRC, vehicular networks could also leverage other wireless
communication technologies. In this paper, we assume that
802.11p is used.
A subset of network nodes form the infrastructure, com-
prised of the short-range DSRC base stations and mobile
units. The latter include public safety vehicles (e.g., highway
assistance and ﬁre-ﬁghting vehicles), police vehicles, and
public transport vehicles (e.g., buses, trams). Infrastructure
nodes serve as the gateway of the CA to and from the vehicular
network; the connection of the CA to the static infrastructure
nodes is over wired secure links. However, we do not assume
that the CA must be accessible from the vehicular network at
all times. The LEAVE and Stinger exclusion1 mechanisms are
carried out by ordinary vehicles, not infrastructure nodes.
B. Threat model
An adversary, or attacker, may control a number of nodes
that deviate from the legitimate vehicular network protocols.
Nodes can also be faulty due to equipment failures. A detailed
discussion of adversary and fault models is given in [13].
As our proposed mechanisms apply to both misbehaving
and errant devices, we use both terms interchangeably. We
emphasize that we are concerned with misbehaving nodes
equipped with valid credentials.
We consider two types of attacker strategy. False infor-
mation dissemination may be a very effective attack, when
compared to deviations from networking protocols. The mo-
tivation for false information dissemination attacks may be
malicious (e.g., sending fake braking information to trigger an
accident) or selﬁsh (e.g., claiming an accident has occurred
to clear congestion). The adversary could either manipulate
1We use the terms eviction and exclusion interchangeably.
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Fig. 1. The LEAVE protocol. Vehicles A, B, C, and F accuse vehicle M
and put it in their respective accusation lists AL. Once the exclusion threshold
is reached, disregard messages are broadcast. M is then added to the blacklist
BL of all accusing vehicles plus the vehicles receiving disregard messages
(D and E). At time 0, D and E are not inM ’s transmission range and cannot
detect its misbehavior.
the sensory inputs or compromise the protocol stack and
the computing platform [13]. An attacker may also control
incoming communication, e.g., selectively erasing messages
received by its on-board platform.
A second attacker strategy is exclusion mechanism abuse. In
the next section, we discuss two proposals for excluding bad
devices from participating on the network. These strategies,
along with any other mechanism that attempts to exclude bad
devices, may be abused by an adversary trying to remove good
devices instead of bad ones.
III. EXCLUDING ERRANT DEVICES
In this section we describe the LEAVE and Stinger mecha-
nisms.
A. LEAVE
LEAVE (Local Eviction of Attackers by Voting Evalua-
tors) [16] is illustrated in Figure 1. Vehicles detecting an
errant device broadcast warning messages to all vehicles in
range. Any vehicle receiving a warning message adds the
warned device to an accusation list. Once enough warning
votes against a node are collected, its identiﬁer is added to
a local blacklist. After nodes are added to the blacklists,
additional disregard messages are repeatedly broadcast to the
local neighborhood instructing the receiving nodes to ignore
the attacker’s messages. Hence, vehicles using LEAVE can
be made aware of bad vehicles before interacting with them.
Finally, the evicted nodes are reported to the CA once within
reach of an infrastructure node.
Deciding when to warn a node using LEAVE is actually
more subtle than surpassing a simple numerical threshold of
warning votes. Rather, it is based on exceeding an exclusion
quotient, a sum of weighted accusations relative to the size of
a vehicle’s neighborhood (the LEAVE paper used an exclusion
quotient of 0.5). The exclusion quotient discounts accusations
from users who have themselves been accused by others, as
proposed by Cre´peau and Davis in [5]. For disregard messages,
a simple threshold is used (the LEAVE paper used a thresh-
old of 4 votes). To demonstrate their legitimacy, disregard
messages include supporting signatures from this threshold of
users.
To be secure, LEAVE requires an honest majority: every
good node must always have more good neighbors than bad. If
the attacker controls more devices than the threshold required
to send disregard messages, then bad devices can eject any
good device at will.
B. Stinger
In [11], Moore et al. propose several strategies that enable
nodes to remove compromised devices from an ad-hoc net-
work. We now discuss how one strategy presented – suicide
attacks – can be adapted for use in vehicular networks.
Procedures for removing a bad device are much simpler
when taken by a single node. Should a node believe another
has misbehaved, it can unilaterally remove the offender. Of
course, a malicious node could falsely accuse legitimate ones.
Therefore, the act of punishment must be made costly for
the deciding node. Suicide attacks remove both the accused
and accuser from the network. Upon detecting a node M
engaging in some illegal activity, node A sends a suicide
note suicideA,M with the identities of both A and M . The
other nodes now disregard both A and M . Sacriﬁcing future
participation is so costly that it unequivocally demonstrates
the veracity of the node’s claim.
The environmental assumptions considered by Moore et
al. do not directly correspond to those present in vehicular
networks. The modiﬁed mechanism is called Stinger, and
suicide notes are called stings. Stinger deviates from suicide
in the following respects:
1) Stinger temporarily prohibits devices from transmitting
messages, but allows them to continue receiving and
forwarding messages;
2) Stinger allows multiple good nodes to be ignored by a
smaller number of devices in order to exclude a single
bad node;
3) Stinger permits good devices to continue accusing bad
ones even after they have issued one sting.
We now describe each of these changes, and their motivation,
in greater detail.
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Fig. 2. Multiple Stingers for bad node B as it moves over time.
First, the original suicide mechanism proposed permanent
ejection from participating on the network. Such harsh pun-
ishment is inappropriate for vehicular communications that
transmit safety information. By contrast, temporary removal
could be used to rapidly ignore an errant transmitter. Since
most interactions are short-lived, temporary removal is equally
effective in tackling misbehavior as it happens without in-
hibiting communication occurring much later. While the sting
instruction prevents the bad and good device from sending
out additional warnings, both still receive safety instructions
from other cars. This minimizes the noticeable impact on the
sacriﬁcing driver while still penalizing a malicious device.
Second, the original suicide mechanism assumed a com-
pletely connected network. Suicide notes were broadcast
throughout the network so that just one good device is removed
for each bad device. Vehicular networks will be comprised
of disconnected islands. High-trafﬁc areas in cities remain
separate from each other and from highways in between.
Furthermore, connections are ephemeral: cars on a motorway
may only be in communication range for a few seconds.
Thus, it is impractical to transmit Stinger messages across a
country in a short time. Instead, Stinger messages must remain
localized, rebroadcast at most a few times. This keeps the
response quick and minimizes communications overhead. It
also means that there will be times where more than one good
node has sacriﬁced itself for the same bad node. Yet the impact
is still limited: rather than having a single node removed for
one bad node, several nodes may be independently removed
for one bad node. Crucially, no single device will ignore two
honest nodes for the same bad node. This is because good
nodes maintain a local blacklist, and they only ignore the ﬁrst
Stinger sender for each accused device.
Figure 2 (left) illustrates how the Stinger protocol works as
cars move. Bad node M is detected by A, which broadcasts
stingA,M to instruct vehicles near A to ignore M . Hence,
nodes B and C add both A and M to their local blacklists,
while D and E do not because they did not receive stingA,M .
As M moves into range of D and E, E issues a new removal
for B, stingE,M . D adds E and M to its local blacklist, but
C does not because it has already ignored M from A’s sting.
This discussion motivates the third difference between sui-
cide and Stinger: good devices continue to accuse bad ones
even after they have issued one sting. This is necessary to
prevent a so-called motorway attacker who widely broadcasts
misbehavior and moves around quickly to attract many stings
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Fig. 3. Rebroadcasting A’s sting against M .
and prevent good nodes from excluding subsequent attackers.
Sting messages are locally transmitted, and they may also
be rebroadcast to warn devices in case the bad device later
moves in other directions. The effect of sting retransmission
is shown in Figure 3. At time 0, bad node M is detected by
A which transmits stingA,M . Nodes B and C then retransmit
the message, notifying D and E. When M moves near to D
and E at time 1, M is already ignored by them.
So what is the cost of Stinger besides message and trans-
mission overhead? Good devices that have issued stings can no
longer warn their neighbors if they detect another misbehaving
device. In Figure 4, bad nodes M1 and M2 are present in
different areas. Nodes A and E issue stings to locally remove
them. However, when M1 moves into the area previously
occupied by M2, E is powerless to warn its neighbors. E
can try to remove M1, but it has no effect since its neighbors
already ignore E’s messages. So F is left to issue stingF,M1 .
In the following analysis, we quantify the adverse impact of
excluding honest devices by measuring any delays introduced
when removing bad devices.
IV. SIMULATION FRAMEWORK
We evaluate the performance of LEAVE and Stinger under
the stringent conditions required by vehicular networks. As
both protocols rely on the ad-hoc operation of vehicles within
short time delays, we simulate it using ns-2 [12] with the
message access control layer parameters of IEEE 802.11p.
Consequently, our simulation takes into account subtleties such
as non-symmetric message reception and timing differences
due to node mobility. LEAVE is implemented with an exclu-
sion coefﬁcient of 0.5 and a disregard threshold of 4, as in the
original LEAVE paper. Each simulation run lasts 200 seconds.
While stings are designed to be temporary, for the purposes
of the short simulation, their effects are treated as permanent.
We now describe how we realistically model dynamic trafﬁc
conditions, attacker behavior, and the operation of detection
mechanisms. We identify key characteristics which we vary
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by A and E; E cannot warn his neighbors about M1 at time 1 since he has
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in the simulations in order to better understand their impact
on LEAVE and Stinger’s security and performance.
A. Modeling dynamic trafﬁc conditions
To simulate different trafﬁc conditions, we vary:
1) average vehicle speed,
2) average vehicle density.
Presently, we use a city trafﬁc model proposed by Saha
and Johnson [17]. In Sections V-B and V-C, we simulate 150
vehicles traveling at 60 km per hr on a 2.4km by 2.4km area
modeled after a city. We then vary the density and speed of
cars in Section V-D. The ns-2 framework used for developing
the simulations is available at [18].
B. Modeling errant behavior and its detection
In the original LEAVE paper [16], attacker behavior and
detection is modeled in a simple fashion. Only one bad node
participates in the system during simulations. Any device
within transmission range of the bad node is deemed vulner-
able to attack. Furthermore, good devices can detect bad ones
as soon as they are within transmission range. We improve
the simulation framework by generalizing the attacker model
to allow for a more capable adversary, as well as arriving at a
more realistic approximation of attacker impact and detection.
We also note that as part of its system model, the original
LEAVE paper assumes an honest majority. In our simulations
we allow for circumstances where this is not true. Even
though the majority of all cars is likely to remain honest, it
is quite reasonable for adversary-controlled devices to reach
temporary, localized majorities.
To vary misbehavior, we tweak the following parameters:
1) the number of attacker-controlled devices,
2) false information dissemination versus exclusion
mechanism abuse,
3) attacker impact range.
We allow the adversary to simultaneously compromise a
number of devices. Attacker-controlled devices can cooperate
and share information. Under false information dissemination
attacks, the adversary attempts to cause accidents or divert
congestion by sending fake safety messages. Malicious nodes
disregard all bad messages originating from other nodes (i.e.,
they do not accuse other malicious nodes). Under exclusion
mechanism abuse, the adversary additionally tries to disrupt
the transmission of safety messages using the exclusion mech-
anism itself (LEAVE or Stinger). Malicious nodes falsely
accuse all non-malicious nodes in communication range. As
the nodes move, they discover who their new neighbors are
and then vote against them. In this way, honest nodes may be
implicated. Bear in mind that once an honest node has detected
a malicious node as such, it ignores its votes. However, there
may be a window of time where an undetected bad node can
trick good nodes into believing that other good nodes are bad.
Exclusion mechanism abuse may not be in the interest of an
attacker whose aim is to remain undetected.
One of the most difﬁcult aspects of simulating attack is de-
termining which devices are made vulnerable by compromised
devices. We approximate vulnerability to attack by proximity
to compromised devices. The closer a device is to an errant
transmitter the likelier it is to be harmed. Hence, in our
simulations we vary the maximum distance from a bad node
where a good node is still vulnerable.
To model detection mechanisms, we vary these parameters:
1) range of revealed misbehavior,
2) false positive rate,
3) false negative rate.
These properties are general to all detection mechanisms,
and we can vary each without restricting our simulations to
using a particular type of detection mechanism.
The simplest approach (taken by the original LEAVE paper)
assumes that good nodes can detect bad ones with 100%
accuracy so long as they are within the bad node’s maximum
transmission range. This behavior does not correspond to
how detection mechanisms might actually work. In many
cases, misbehavior can only be detected much closer to an
adversary (e.g., if another car’s sensors can directly observe
the other car or its environment). To account for this, we
can restrict detection to nodes within a speciﬁed distance.
Typically, the maximum range of detection will be less than
the maximum range of attacker impact. For example, a car
sending a fake crash warning message is likely to be detected
by its immediate neighbors, but cars further away will still
be affected precisely because they believe the misinformation
and react to it.
Another unfortunate property of detection mechanisms is
their susceptibility to error. A false positive occurs whenever
the detection mechanism ﬂags a good device as bad. Similarly,
a false negative happens when the detection mechanism mis-
takes a bad device for a good one. In our simulations we vary
the likelihood of false positives and negatives over time. For
instance, a false positive rate of 10% means that there is a one
in ten chance of a false accusation per minute of interacting
with other devices.
V. SIMULATION ANALYSIS
In this section we compare the security and performance
of LEAVE and Stinger while varying the parameters just
discussed.
A. Security and performance metrics
We compute three metrics:
1) average time good devices are vulnerable,
2) average percentage of good neighbors that are ignored,
3) average number of messages received per device.
The ﬁrst two metrics describe the security properties of the
protocols, while the third is used to compute overhead.
Most envisioned attacks on vehicular networks are time-
critical – they spread misinformation that causes a car to
quickly make an incorrect decision. Hence, bad devices must
be detected and removed very quickly. We measured the aver-
age time good devices are vulnerable to attack by a bad node.
Here, vulnerability is deﬁned as being within transmission
range of an unblocked bad device.
The second security metric we measure is the average
percentage of good neighbors that are ignored due to the
exclusion protocol. Each ignored neighbor reduces the number
of devices that can transmit safety information, as well as
participate in the Stinger or LEAVE exclusion mechanisms.
This metric is usually more important for Stinger, since good
devices forgo participation in order to remove bad devices.
However, it is still possible for good nodes to be excluded in
LEAVE (due to accidental or malicious voting against good
devices).
The ﬁnal metric offers a useful comparison of the work
required for each strategy, since each message requires a
cryptographic veriﬁcation operation.
B. Detection mechanism parameters
The detection mechanism’s capabilities can directly impact
the effectiveness of the exclusion mechanism. To demonstrate
this, we computed the security metrics while varying the
detection mechanism’s characteristics under the assumption
that only one device is compromised (see Figure 5).
Figure 5 (top left) shows how the time devices are vulner-
able varies depending on the maximum distance for which
bad devices can be detected. Devices can transmit up to 300
meters. Ideally, we would like the detection mechanism to
trigger as soon as a good device comes within this transmission
range. In this case, devices are vulnerable for 2.9 seconds
before ignoring bad devices using LEAVE. Unsurprisingly,
Stinger is faster (0.6 seconds with no rebroadcasts).
As we reduce the maximum range for which misbehavior
can be detected, the time exposed increases. For LEAVE, the
vulnerable time increases fastest, to 11.4 seconds for 200m and
25.8 seconds for 100m. For Stinger without retransmission,
the lag is 4.1 seconds for 200m and 8.6 seconds for 100m.
Increasing the number of rebroadcasts further minimizes the
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Fig. 5. Security and performance costs introduced by imperfections in the detection mechanism.
time exposed at the expense of additional message overhead.
Both LEAVE and Stinger do shorten the overall exposure time,
which is 29.8 seconds. Notably, LEAVE barely helps when the
detection is not very good (25.3 seconds exposure for 100m
maximum detection range).
Varying the maximum detection range has no impact on the
proportion of good neighbors ignored (Figure 5 (bottom left)).
This is not surprising, given that reducing the detection range
only enables more bad devices to go undetected, which does
not trigger false accusations against good nodes. For Stinger,
just 0.3% of a node’s good neighbors are ignored on average.
This proportion is so small because the devices issuing stings
are likely to change neighbors frequently. Increasing the false
positive rate, by contrast, does cause good devices to ignore
each other more often. Figure 5 (bottom center) shows that the
percentage of good neighbors ignored increases signiﬁcantly
as false positives are more likely. Notably, false positive rates
of up to 10% do not cause problems for LEAVE, so long as
false positives are not correlated.
Recall from Figure 5 (top left) that the time vulnerable to
attack decreases as stings are rebroadcast. In Figure 5 (bottom
center), the ordering is reversed. Rebroadcasting stings causes
more good devices to be ignored. With a 5% chance of
false positive per minute of interaction, 12% of a device’s
good neighbors are ignored when stings are not retransmitted,
18% are ignored with one retransmission and 20% ignored
with two retransmissions. Hence, there is a direct trade-off
between speed of excluding bad devices and the number of
good neighbors ignored.
The most noteworthy observation from the two graphs in
Figure 5 (right) is that increasing the false negative rate to 10%
has almost no impact. While not shown in the graph, the same
holds as the share of attacker-controlled devices increases to
10%. While the time vulnerable slightly decreases for LEAVE
in the top center and top right graphs, the change might be
attributed to variation between simulation runs.
C. Adversary strategies
We now vary adversarial capabilities and strategies (Fig-
ure 6). The left-hand side graphs measure the effects of
false information dissemination (i.e., a strategy that does not
attempt to abuse the exclusion mechanism), while the right-
hand side measures exclusion mechanism abuse where the goal
is to cause as much damage using the exclusion mechanism
as possible. In both cases, we set the maximum distance
for detecting bad devices to 200m with no chance of false
positives or negatives.
We simulated situations where the adversary controls from
1 device up to 15, which is 10% of all devices. This does
not mean that an attacker has compromised 10% of an entire
country’s vehicles, which is unrealistic for all but the strongest
adversaries. Rather, compromising 10% of the vehicles in a
localized region (in our simulations, a 5.8 km2 area) is quite
reasonable for relatively capable adversaries.
As the proportion of attacker-controlled devices increases,
the time each good device is vulnerable increases (Figure 6
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Fig. 6. Security and performance costs as the attacker controls more
devices. The left-hand side graphs measure the false information dissemination
strategy, while the right-hand side graphs measure exclusion mechanism
abuse.
(top)). Consistent with Figure 5 (top left), LEAVE keeps
devices vulnerable for longer than Stinger does. Note from
Figure 6 (top right) that the vulnerable time actually decreases
when the attacker is actively abusing Stinger. This is because
maliciously transmitting stings instructs good devices to ignore
the bad one. When the attacker’s aim is to remain undetected,
false information dissemination is preferred.
By contrast, Figure 6 (middle) and (bottom) explain why
an attacker might prefer abusing the exclusion mechanism.
When using a false information dissemination strategy, the
proportion of good neighbors ignored remains small: 2.8% of
good neighbors are ignored using Stinger without rebroadcasts
when 10% of devices are controlled by the adversary (Figure 6
(middle left)). Under an exclusion mechanism abuse strategy,
the proportion of ignored good neighbors jumps to 21.2%
(Figure 6 (middle right)). This proportion is still much smaller
than the worst-case scenario. With 10% attacker-controlled
devices, there could be more bad devices present than a good
device has neighbors. Hence, we might expect all devices to
be ignored, but the simulations do not bear this out.
Why not? In the worst case for collateral damage caused
by active Stinger abuse, an attacker continually broadcasting
stings against every neighbor can trick every good device to
ignore one honest neighbor. With luck, this one ignored honest
neighbor could remain in communication range permanently.
This is hard to achieve in practice since cars move and
naturally change neighbors. Furthermore, it is very difﬁcult
for an attacker to locally interact with every other car to
determine a legitimate neighbor to remove. Therefore, it is
not surprising that the proportion of ignored good neighbors
plateaus as the attacker controls more devices, as indicated in
Figure 6 (middle right).
As mentioned in Section III-A, the worst-case scenario for
abusing LEAVE is a roaming pack of attackers. So long as
the number of attackers exceed the voting threshold, they can
quickly eject any device at will. We did not simulate this
situation because the outcome is clear: all good devices are
removed. Instead, we simulate the situation where attacker-
controlled devices vote against their neighbors continuously,
but in an uncoordinated fashion. As can be seen from the
simulations, uncoordinated malicious voting is completely
ineffective.
Figure 6 (bottom) compares the number of messages re-
ceived when using LEAVE and Stinger for a range of rebroad-
casts. So long as the adversary is not attempting to abuse the
eviction mechanisms, Stinger requires fewer messages than
LEAVE whenever stings are only rebroadcast one time, or not
at all (Figure 6 (bottom left)). Beyond that, LEAVE is more
efﬁcient in terms of message overhead.
When abusing the exclusion mechanism, however, the im-
pact on overhead changes dramatically (Figure 6 (bottom
right)). Stinger without rebroadcasting remains the most ef-
ﬁcient strategy, but adding rebroadcasting leads to a huge
increase in overhead. With 10% of the devices under adversary
control, Stinger without rebroadcasting requires each device
to receive 65 messages, compared to 311 with a single re-
transmission and 588 with two retransmissions. This dramatic
difference provides further evidence that using Stinger without
retransmissions is the best approach.
D. Trafﬁc conditions
The analysis so far has considered a single, typical trafﬁc
scenario. But what happens when trafﬁc conditions change?
We varied both the density of trafﬁc and the average speed of
vehicles.
Figure 7 plots the results with 10 bad devices present and a
200m maximum distance for detecting bad devices. Increasing
the density of trafﬁc has a negative effect on LEAVE and a
slightly positive effect on Stinger. Surprisingly, the average
time devices are vulnerable increases as more cars are present
when using LEAVE (Figure 7 (top left)). Under Stinger, by
contrast, the time vulnerable decreases slightly as the density
increases.
The number of messages that must be processed also
increases signiﬁcantly under LEAVE, while remaining steady
when using Stinger (Figure 7 (bottom left)). This is because
the number of other cars within communication range of each
vehicle increases under higher densities. More neighboring
vehicles means more broadcast warning messages from each
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Fig. 7. Security and performance costs while varying trafﬁc conditions.
nearby device. Since only one vehicle (or a few in the event of
a collision) issues a sting for bad devices, there is no increase
in overhead with increased trafﬁc.
The right-hand side graphs in Figure 7 measure the effects
of increasing the speed of vehicles, and therefore, reducing the
average connection time between vehicles. From these graphs,
it appears that speed does not have a signiﬁcant impact on the
security or performance of Stinger and LEAVE.
VI. HYBRID, ADAPTIVE EXCLUSION STRATEGIES
The analysis in this section has identiﬁed a number of trade-
offs between LEAVE and Stinger for different scenarios. To
summarize:
• LEAVE is more resilient to non-zero false positive rates.
• Fewer good nodes are ignored using LEAVE than Stinger
when an attacker abuses the exclusion mechanism.
• Stinger excludes bad devices faster, leaving a shorter
vulnerability window.
• Stinger scales better as the density of vehicles increases.
Unfortunately, there is no clear winner between LEAVE and
Stinger. LEAVE does a better job of handling false positives
than Stinger, while Stinger is signiﬁcantly faster than LEAVE
when removing bad devices under every condition we tested.
Speed of removal is critical to limit the transmission of
misinformation.
We conclude that a hybrid strategy that adapts to system
parameters and the environment would be able to get the best
of both mechanisms, if applied properly. More precisely, three
main factors affect the choice of the exclusion mechanism:
tolerable vulnerability window, false positive rate, and the
detected percentage of attackers. These factors are in turn
inﬂuenced by the safety application in question (e.g., the
vulnerability window of a hazard-warning application depends
on the distance to the accident), the misbehavior being detected
(e.g., mild tampering with location information is not easily
detected) and trafﬁc density. Hence, we propose the following
hybrid strategy that takes these three factors into account:
1) While the vulnerability window achieved by LEAVE is
tolerable, use LEAVE. Since detection mechanisms are
unlikely to have zero false positive rates, Stinger will
ignore a certain percentage of good neighbors.
2) When the tolerable vulnerability window is bypassed
(e.g., due to increasing trafﬁc conditions in the car’s
local view), switch to Stinger, but still allow devices to
vote. If enough votes come in, then the stinging node
can be allowed to participate again. This may help to
reduce the number of ignored neighboring devices (see
Figure 5 (bottom center) and Figure 6 (middle right)).
The hybrid strategy can be expressed by the following
algorithm:
1: while tol vuln window ≥ vuln window LEAVE do
2: run LEAVE
3: end while
4: if tol vuln window < vuln window LEAVE then
5: repeat
6: run Stinger
7: blacklist stinging node
8: until threshold LEAVE is reached
9: if attacker excluded by LEAVE then
10: release stinging node
11: end if
12: end if
Vehicles need not synchronize their choice of exclusion
algorithm; rather, devices locally decide whether to run Stinger
or LEAVE, while honoring the actions of others. Suppose de-
vice A is running LEAVE and it observes stingB,M1 . A ignores
both B and M1, but A still sends out warning messages using
LEAVE if it observes another malicious deviceM2. If enough
other vehicles using LEAVE warn M2, then disregardM2
messages are broadcast and recognized by vehicles using
Stinger.
The evaluation of this algorithm requires testing several ap-
plications in variable trafﬁc scenarios. We leave this endeavor
to future work. A particular challenge to be explored further
is locally estimating vulnerability windows.
VII. RELATED WORK
The literature on vehicular networks already contains meth-
ods for detecting bad devices. For example, Leinmu¨ller et al.
propose threshold-based tests to verify positioning information
in vehicular networks [10]. In [6], a general framework for
detecting malicious data detection compared received data to
a vehicular network model.
Techniques for removing bad devices from a network often
fall under the broad category of revocation. Revocation has
been considered mostly in the context of the wired Internet
and the design of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) services
[7]. Disseminating revocation information across vehicular
networks, given their size and volatility, would be impractical
using the same methods proposed for the ﬁxed infrastructure.
Most existing works on vehicular network security [14],
[15], [20] have proposed the use of a PKI and digital signatures
but do not provide any mechanisms for certiﬁcate revocation,
even though it is a required component of any PKI-based
solution. In the context of vehicular networks, the IEEE 1609.2
Draft Standard [8] does refer to certiﬁcate revocation. It has
proposed the distribution of CRLs and short-lived certiﬁcates,
but does not elaborate how to achieve this. The paper propos-
ing LEAVE [16] also described a more comprehensive revo-
cation strategy that leverages the infrastructure to efﬁciently
distribute revocation lists from CAs. In this context, LEAVE
is a fast, temporary exclusion mechanism which triggers a
slower, permanent revocation by the CA. Stinger can also be
used for this purpose.
In this paper, we have distributed the task of temporar-
ily excluding bad devices to untrusted vehicles to improve
timeliness, while keeping the CA’s substantial responsibilities
centralized. Others have distributed the CA’s responsibilities
in different contexts. Zhou and Haas investigated CAs for
use in mobile ad-hoc networks, distributing their functionality
across a number of servers [21]. However, this scheme does
not consider the problem of revocation, especially in a highly
mobile environment like a vehicular network. Splitting up CA
responsibilities over impromptu coalitions of devices (e.g.,
[5], [9]) is similar in motivation to the voting structure of
LEAVE. Chan et al. [3] distribute static votes for excluding
bad devices from a wireless sensor network. Unfortunately,
threshold cryptography is of limited use whenever the voting
coalitions are as dynamic as the short-lived neighbors in a
vehicular network.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we compared two protocols, LEAVE and
Stinger, for excluding misbehaving or faulty devices from ad-
hoc networks. We applied them in the context of vehicular net-
works where fast exclusion is both critical and hard to achieve,
given the ephemeral properties of the environment. Based on a
detailed simulation analysis, we found that both protocols have
unique advantages and disadvantages. In particular, Stinger is
faster than LEAVE and scales better with increasing trafﬁc
density, but LEAVE is more resilient to false positives and
higher percentages of attackers abusing the exclusion mech-
anism. We therefore devised a hybrid algorithm, allowing
devices to choose the strategy that best suits the circumstances.
We leave the evaluation of this algorithm to future work. We
are optimistic that a mixed strategy for excluding bad devices
might perform better than a single single strategy in the highly
dynamic environment characteristic of vehicular networks.
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